Competing in the Shadowy Gray: Protecting Domestic Trademark Holders from Gray Marketeers under the Lanham Act by Yoshor, Shira R.
Competing in the Shadowy Gray: Protecting
Domestic Trademark Holders from Gray
Marketeers Under the Lanham Act
Shira R. Yoshort
Frieda the frugal shopper wants to buy a new camera. She sees
an advertisement in her morning paper for the latest Nikon model,
and, thus inspired, goes to her neighborhood Nikon dealer, Nikons,
Etc. Nikons, Etc. is an authorized dealer that has trained person-
nel to answer any questions that customers may have about the
current line of Nikon products. Nikons, Etc. also provides lifetime
servicing of its Nikon products. Frieda spends an hour with a very
friendly and helpful salesperson. However, Frieda does not
purchase a new camera at Nikons, Etc. Instead, she walks down
the block to Discount Electronics, a small discount electronics
store with no customer service department. Armed with her newly
acquired knowledge, she purchases the exact model camera that
was demonstrated for her at Nikons, Etc. When her camera does
not function properly, she returns to Nikons, Etc. and asks for
help. Although the salesperson remembers that Frieda did not ac-
tually purchase anything on her last visit, in order to protect
Nikons, Etc.'s reputation as a complete servicing agent for all
Nikon equipment, he provides Frieda with the assistance that she
needs. Nikons, Etc. is damaged in two ways: the free riding for
sales advice and the free riding for service.
In the 1980s an enormous market developed for gray market
goods, otherwise known as parallel imports. Several years ago, its
value was estimated as high as ten billion dollars per year.' Gray
market goods, including Johnson's personal care products, Seiko
watches, Oil of Olay skin cream, Opium fragrance, Old Spice de-
odorant, Paco Rabanne pour Homme and Nikon cameras,2 are au-
thentic trademarked goods that are imported by someone other
than the domestic trademark holder, and are sometimes sold at a
t B.A. 1989, Yeshiva University; J.D. 1992, The University of Chicago.
' Paula Dwyer and Amy Dunkin, A Red-Letter Day for Gray Marketers, Bus Week 30,
(Jun 13, 1988).
2 Joyce Barrett, Discounters Oppose Ban on Gray Goods; Manufactured Goods Made
for Sale Overseas, 159 Women's Wear Daily 25 (Apr 5, 1990).
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discount to consumers. Gray market goods are genuine; they are
not counterfeit goods exchanged on the black market. Nor are gray
market goods stolen products; they are usually purchased abroad
by importers and shipped to this country during favorable cur-
rency fluctuations. A strong dollar enables the gray marketeer to
ship the goods to the United States and often to sell these prod-
ucts at lower costs to consumers than the price charged by the au-
thorized distributor. Additionally, the gray marketeer avoids the
advertising and servicing costs borne by the authorized distributor.
Gray markets may also develop from diversion. Diversion oc-
curs when third parties purchase genuine goods, like beauty aids,
from licensed product retailers. These beauty aids, made specifi-
cally for salons, are then sold to other retailers or discount drug
stores at a hefty profit.3 A third possibility is that gray markets
may develop in products that are produced at lower costs in other
countries. These lower costs can often be attributed to lower qual-
ity standards.4 Sometimes the lower quality standards result from
the lack of governmental quality controls.5 Other qualitative differ-
ences stem from consumer preferences.6
In the past, domestic trademark holders have tried several al-
ternatives to curb this unwanted competition from gray market
goods, but none have proven entirely successful. Most litigation
has involved provisions of the Lanham Act,7 the Tariff Act of
1930,8 state trademark infringement statutes, unfair competition
claims, or breach of contract actions. Congress has exacerbated the
already unclear status of gray market imports by promulgating
ambiguous legislation, which the courts have inconsistently applied
to various gray market activities.
Many litigants have relied on the Lanham Act to protect their
capital investments in trademarks. Trademark holders have long
3Elizabeth Chute, Gray Market Persists Amid Lax Customs Laws, 159 Women's Wear
Daily, Cosmetic, Toiletry and Fragrance Association Supplement C65 (Feb 23, 1990). See
also Sebastian International, Inc. v Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F2d 1093 (3d Cir
1988).
' Dwight L. Miller, Restricting the Gray Market in Trademarked Goods: Per Se Legal-
ity, 76 Trademark Rptr 363, 374-75 (1986), citing Lexecon Inc., The Economics of Gray-
Market Imports 1, 44-46 (1985) (unpublished) (on file with U Chi L Rev). This is one of the
gray market problems that is addressed later in the Comment.
Scott D. Gilbert, Eugene A. Ludwig, and Carol A. Fortine, Federal Trademark Law
and the Gray Market: The Need for a Cohesive Policy, 18 L & Policy in Intl Bus 103, 110-
11 (1986).
6 Lever Brothers Co. v United States, 877 F2d 101, 103 (DC Cir 1989).
15 USC §§ 1114, 1124, 1125 (1988).
8 19 USC § 1526 (1988).
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used the Act to combat the importation and distribution of copied
or simulated goods in the black market. This traditional applica-
tion against counterfeit goods is not judicially controversial.'
Courts are more reticent, however, when asked to apply the Act's
protections to prevent the importation and distribution of gray
market goods. Application of the Lanham Act requires a finding
that consumers are likely to be "confused" by the use of a trade-
mark.10 Courts have divided over whether consumers can be "con-
fused" when goods are genuine. Because goods on the gray market
are, by definition, not counterfeit or stolen, some courts refuse to
recognize claims against importers of gray market goods. Other
courts have relied on the differences in quality, physical composi-
tion, and customer service packages to find the requisite confusion
for Lanham Act protection.
The history, purposes, and development of trademarks and
the gray market inform the propriety of the Lanham Act's invoca-
tion by domestic trademark holders complaining of gray market
infringement. Section I of this Comment focuses on the relation-
ship between the Lanham Act and the prevailing theories of trade-
mark. Section II analyzes the gray market cases, detailing how,
when, and in what context they arise. This analysis will demon-
strate that the Tariff Act and its attendant Customs Regulations
are too limited in scope to effectively control the gray market. Sec-
tion III details the split among the courts in their application of
the Lanham Act to the gray market. Section IV concludes that the
Lanham Act protects domestic trademark holders from gray mar-
ket infringement.
I. ESSENTIALS OF TRADEMARK LAW: THE LANHAM ACT AND THE
DOCTRINE OF TERRITORIALITY
Recently there have been several cases brought under the Lan-
ham Act by domestic trademark holders seeking to protect their
trademarks from gray market importers. The claims put forward
by the domestic trademark holders are premised on the purposes
of the Lanham Act and the trademark doctrine of territoriality.
' See, for example, Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v Roberts, 944 F2d 1235 (6th Cir 1991);
Chanel, Inc. v Italian Activewear of Florida, Inc., 931 F2d 1472 (l1th Cir 1991); Shell Oil
Co. v Commercial Petroleum, Inc., 928 F2d 104 (4th Cir 1991).
'o 15 USC § 1125.
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A. The Purposes of Federal Trademark Legislation: The Legisla-
tive History of the Lanham Act
The Lanham Act 1 was introduced in 1938, and Congress en-
acted it on July 5, 1946. The Act marked "Congress' attempt at
eliminating confusion from the marketplace with regard to the
identification of goods and services .... ,12 In general, the Lanham
Act's prohibitions are directed against the false description or false
designation of the origin of goods or services, including false adver-
tising and selling one's goods under the name of a competitor.' 3
Generally, the Lanham Act provides "greater assurance that
the good will actually be manufactured to the specifications of the
formula"'14 by prohibiting the use of confusing words, terms,
names, symbols or devices. The statute is directed against:
(a) Any person . . . who uses in commerce any word, term,
name, symbol, or device ... which-
(1) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship,
or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activi-
ties by another person .... 15
This language is more specific than the original text, which only
generally prohibited the use of false descriptions or representations
and false designations of origin in commerce.' 6 Section 43(a) en-
ables consumers to rely on particular trademarks for product rec-
" 15 USC §§ 1051-1127 (1988).
1 Perini Corporation v Perini Construction, Inc., 915 F2d 121, 124 (4th Cir 1990).
13 Roho, Inc. v Marquis, 902 F2d 356, 359 (5th Cir 1990).
" William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspec-
tive, 30 J L & Econ 265, 275 (1987).
" Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 USC § 1125.
16 The original legislation stated:
(a) Civil Action
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods or
services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation of origin, or any
false description or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely" to
describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into
commerce, and any person who shall with knowledge of the falsity of such designation
of origin or description or representation cause or procure the same to be transported
or used in commerce or deliver the same to any carrier to be transported or used, shall
be liable to a civil action by any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated
as that of origin or in the region in which said locality is situated, or by any person who
believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or
representation.
15 USC § 1125 (1982).
1366 [59:1363
Gray Marketeers
ognition, thereby reducing shopping costs and permitting quicker
purchasing decisions. 7
The Senate report on the Lanham Act described its two pur-
poses. First, the Act assures the public that a product bearing a
particular trademark is "the product which it asks for and wants to
get."'" Trademarks encourage the production of quality products
because consumers identify a specific product by its trademark.,'
Consumers who are dissatisfied with a product will not purchase it
again. Consumers who are pleased with a product will identify it
by the trademark and purchase it again.
Second, the Lanham Act is designed "to protect 'the synony-
mous right of a trademark owner to control his product's reputa-
tion.' -2o Trademark rights are an integral part of a business of the
holder.2' The Senate report recognized the importance of trade-
mark protection in thwarting free-rider problems22 and preserving
goodwill for the domestic trademark holder.23 Thus, the report
suggests that the enacting senators realized that the value of a
trademark is "as real as the value of a manufacturing plant.
24
B. The Provisions of the Lanham Act
Several provisions of the Lanham Act are potentially available
to domestic trademark holders seeking to prevent entry of gray
market imports into the United States. Section 42 prohibits
article[s] of imported merchandise . . . which shall copy or
simulate a trademark registered in accordance with the provi-
sions of this chapter or shall bear a name or mark calculated
to induce the public to believe that the article is manufac-
tured in the United States, or that it is manufactured in any
" Landes and Posner, 30 J L & Econ at 269 (cited in note 14).
,S Senate Committee on Patents, S Rep No 1333, 79th Cong, 2d Sess 1 (May 14, 1946),
in 1946 USCCAN 1274.
"I J. Thomas McCarthy, 1 Trademarks and Unfair Competition 44 (Lawyers Co-op, 2d
ed 1984).
20 Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F2d 200, 205 (2d
Cir 1979), citing James Burrough, Ltd. v Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F2d 266, 274 (7th
Cir 1976).
21 See United Drug Co. v Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 US 90, 97 (1918).
22 S Rep No 1333, in 1946 USCCAN at 1274 (cited in note 18) ("Where the owner of a
trade-mark has spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public the product, he is
protected in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats.").
22 Id ("securing to the owner the good will of his business").
" Lexecon, The Economics of Gray-Market Imports at 13 (cited in note 4).
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foreign country or locality other than the country or locality
in which it is in fact manufactured .... 25
Similarly, § 32 prohibits "use in commerce [of] any reproduc-
tion, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark
in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or adver-
tising of any goods.., with which such use is likely to cause confu-
sion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. .... ,,2' The domestic trade-
mark holder is required to show that the gray market importer is
using the trademark without the domestic markholder's consent, in
connection with the sale of goods, and in a manner likely to cause
confusion with the plaintiffs registered trademark.
It is presently unresolved whether § 32 or § 42 are available to
domestic trademark holders against gray market imports, since the
language of both sections appears to target copies or counterfeit
goods-as opposed to the less stringent § 43, which deals with false
or misleading goods. Because gray market goods are genuine, these
sections of the Lanham Act are a weaker basis for claims against
gray market goods than § 43. Moreover, Justice Scalia's dissent in
K Mart Corp. v Cartier, Inc.2 7 has arguably ruled out the use of
§ 42 in the gray market context, although some courts have not
considered this dissent dispositive.2s He noted that § 42 of the
Lanham Act "prohibits importation of goods of foreign or domestic
manufacture bearing not genuine trademarks identical to a United
States trademark, but trademarks that 'copy or simulate' a re-
corded trademark. '29 At face value, this comment effectively rules
out any protection from the gray market based on a claim brought
under this section, since gray market goods do not have counterfeit
trademarks. However, this statement may not be fatal to domestic
tradeholders who seek protection from the gray market under the
other sections of the Lanham Act.
Section 43 of the Lanham Act is a better mechanism for do-
mestic trademark holders to prevent gray market importation than
either § 42 or § 32. Protection under § 43(a) requires a showing of
a likelihood of confusion.30 The plaintiff must "believe [] that he or
she is or is likely to be damaged" 31 before a court will determine
26 15 USC § 1124.
26 15 USC § .1114(1)(a).
27 486 US 281 (1988).
28 See, for example, Lever Brothers Co. v United States, 877 F2d 101 (DC Cir 1989).
" 486 US at 320 n 1.
30 Spring Mills, Inc. v Ultracashmere House, Ltd., 689 F2d 1127, 1129, 1136 (2d Cir
1982).
31 15 USC § 1125.
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whether consumer confusion has occurred. In Polaroid Corpora-
tion v Polarad Electronics Corporation, Judge Friendly set forth a
balancing test to determine whether a competing trademark has
caused confusion.3 2 The test includes an analysis of:
1) the strength of the mark, 2) the degree of similarity be-
tween the two marks, 3) the proximity of the products, 4) the
likelihood that the senior user of the mark will bridge the gap,
5) evidence of actual confusion, 6) the junior user's bad faith
vel non in adopting the mark, 7) the quality of the junior
user's product, and, finally, 8) the sophistication of the rele-
vant consumer group.3
If the court concludes, from a consideration of these factors, that
the trademark has caused confusion, the Lanham Act protects the
trademark holders.3 Normally the domestic trademark holder
seeks an injunction to prevent the damaging goods from entering
the country or to restrict the products from sale. The domestic
trademark holder also may be entitled to monetary damages. 5
However, the courts are divided on whether there can be con-
fusion when the trademark-infringing goods are genuine. Because
goods on the gray market are, by definition, not counterfeit or sto-
len, some courts have refused to recognize trademark claims
against unauthorized importers of genuine goods. Other courts
have relied on differences in quality, appearance, composition, and
service to find consumer confusion when gray market goods are
genuine.
C. Territoriality Versus Universality
The division in the courts over the applicability of the Lan-
ham Act in gray market litigation stems from a fundamental disa-
greement over trademark doctrines. The applicability of the Lan-
ham Act in gray market litigation turns on whether courts
subscribe to the "universality" or the "territoriality" theory of
trademarks.
The traditional "universality" view of trademarks assumes
that a trademark knows no territorial bounds and that an owner of
32 287 F2d 492, 495 (2d Cir 1961).
" Centaur Communications, Ltd. v AISIM Communications, Inc., 830 F2d 1217, 1225
(2d Cir 1987), citing Polaroid, 287 F2d at 495.
" The protection afforded to successful plaintiffs under the Lanham Act is outlined in
§§ 34, 35, and 43(b) of the Lanham Act, 15 USC §§ 1116, 1117 and 1125(b) respectively.
" Monetary damages are sometimes limited to those who have registered trademarks.
See 15 USC § 1117(a).
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a trademark possesses the trademark's rights to the exclusion of
everyone else in the world.-" Justice Brennan described the univer-
sality approach as one in which "trademarks do not confer on the
owner property interests or monopoly power over intrabrand com-
petition. Rather, they merely protect the public from deception by
indicating 'the origin of the goods they mark.' 9Y37
The corollary that developed in conjunction with the univer-
sality doctrine is the theory of "trademark exhaustion." 38 Under
the doctrine of trademark exhaustion, trademark owners lose con-
trol over their trademarked goods once the goods are released into
the stream of commerce. 9 Consequently, parallel importers and
others along the chain of commerce may then display, advertise,
and resell the trademarked goods. Some courts, however, have held
that exhaustion does not apply when the domestic trademark
holder has developed separate and independent goodwill.40
The modern view of trademarks is that of "territoriality." Ter-
ritoriality is the ability of a company to purchase the rights to a
trademark within a specific territory.4 The territoriality theory of
trademarks dates from Justice Holmes's opinion in the first major
gray market case, A. Bourjois & Co., Inc. v Katzel. 42 Contemporary
courts have indicated that the territoriality approach "maintains
that the source and scope of trademark protection arise from the
law of a particular sovereign state, and thus that it is meaningless
to discuss 'genuineness' of a trademark in the abstract. '43 Another
court described the function of a trademark under the territoriality
theory as
not necessarily to specify the origin or manufacture of a good
(although it may incidentally do that), but rather to symbolize
the domestic goodwill of the domestic markholder so that the
consuming public may rely with an expectation of consistency
on the domestic reputation earned for the mark by its owner
36 Osawa & Co. v B & H Photo, 589 F Supp 1163, 1171 (S D NY 1984).
37 K Mart, 486 US at 301, citing A. Bourjois & Co. v Katzel, 275 F2d 539, 543 (2d Cir
1921).
38 McCarthy, 1 Trademarks and Unfair Competition at 261 (cited in note 19). See also
Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v Dash, 878 F2d 659, 677 n 5 (3d Cir 1989) (Becker
concurring).
39 McCarthy, 1 Trademarks and Unfair Competition at 261.
40 Id. But see NEC Electronics v CAL Circuit Abco, 810 F2d 1506 (9th Cir 1986); Weil
Ceramics & Glass, 878 F2d 659; Olympus Corp. v United States, 792 F2d 315 (2d Cir 1986).
" K Mart, 486 US at 315 (Brennan concurring in part and dissenting in part).
42 260 US 689 (1923). See also Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trade-
marks (COPIAT) v United States, 790 F2d 903, 909-10 (DC Cir 1986).
"' COPIAT, 790 F2d at 909 (emphasis in original).
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[which permits] the owner of the mark [to] be confident that
his goodwill and reputation (the value of the mark) will not be
injured through use of the mark by others in domestic
commerce.
44
Because the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property recognizes that trademark rights are territorial,45 territo-
riality seems to be the accepted modern view of trademarks.46
Modern commercial arrangements, such as licensing and assign-
ment of trademarks for use in a specific territory, similarly indicate
that territoriality represents the contemporary understanding of
trademarks.4 The territorial view captures the essential functions
of trademarks, as expressed both by the authors of the Lanham
Act and by modern economists.48
II. THE GRAY MARKET: THE TYPICAL CASES AND THEIR LEGAL
POSTURES
Before 1922, gray market importation into the United States
was unrestricted. Even if the trademark rights were purchased by
an American corporation and the foreign manufacturer continued
to export its products to the United States contrary to its agree-
ment, the American corporation had no legal means to prevent the
entry of such imports.49 While gray market goods are still imported
today, the entry of certain types of gray market goods is prohibited
under the Tariff Act50 and its corresponding regulations.
A. The Three Gray Market Scenarios
Gray market goods are generally imported in one of three sce-
narios. The first arises when a domestic company purchases the
" Osawa, 589 F Supp at 1171-72.
4' Article 6(3) states "[a] mark duly registered in a country of the Union shall be re-
garded as independent of marks registered in the other countries of the Union, including the
country of origin." Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 21 UST 1583,
1639 (1967).
46 This is true because Article VI of the United States Constitution and § 44(b) of the
Lanham Act incorporate the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property into
the law of the United States. See US Const, Art VI, cl 2; 15 USC § 1126(b).
'7 See Weil Ceramics & Glass, 878 F2d at 677 n 5 (Becker concurring) ("The universal-
ity theory is no longer viable.").
" See text at notes 12-24.
'9 Hunyadi Janos Corp. v Stoeger, 285 F 861, 864 (2d Cir 1922); Fred Gretsch Mfg. Co.
v Schoening, 238 F 780, 782 (2d Cir 1916); Apollinaris Co. v Scherer, 27 F 18, 20 (S D NY
1886).
50 19 USC § 1526.
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rights to register and use a trademark from a foreign manufac-
turer, and a third party imports the foreign product. The goods
imported are essentially the same as the ones produced by the do-
mestic company who recently invested capital in the trademark.
The importer benefits from the consumer recognition of the trade-
mark, which creates a market for his goods.
The Supreme Court prohibited this type of gray market im-
portation in A. Bourjois & Co., Inc. v Katzel 51 This type of impor-
tation is also subject to seizure and forfeiture under the Tariff
Act.52 Clearly, domestic trademark holders need not fear infringe-
ment from these types of gray market goods since these gray mar-
ket goods are legally barred from entry into the United States.
The second type of gray market arises when an American
trademark holder authorizes an independent foreign manufacturer
to use its trademark in a specific foreign location, but a third party
purchases these goods abroad and imports them to the United
States. 'Typically this case will involve licensing agreements or
other similar arrangements.53 The licensee sells its licensed prod-
ucts to the public in some market and an opportunistic buyer takes
advantage of currency fluctuations to purchase the products and
sell them in the United States. These gray market goods are barred
from entry under the Tariff Act, unless there is written consent
from the domestic trademark holder.5 1
The third type of gray market importation occurs when either
a foreign corporation establishes an American subsidiary which
registers the identical trademark in the United States,55 or an
American corporation establishes a foreign subsidiary or an unin-
corporated manufacturing division abroad s.5 Goods that are manu-
factured overseas and shipped to the United States by anyone
"' 260 US 689 (1923).
52 19 USC § 1526(b). Also, under 19 USC § 1526(c), any person dealing in such mer-
chandise may be enjoined from dealing with such merchandise in the United States or re-
quired to export or destroy such merchandise or remove its trademark.
53 Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v Granada Electronics, Inc., 816 F2d 68 (2d Cir
1987), is a perfect example of this gray market scenario. For further discussion, see text at
note 89.
" 19 USC § 1526(a). These goods are no longer exempted from the Tariff Act ban and
can be denied entry by Customs officials under the Customs Regulations in 19 CFR § 133.21
(1991).
11 This occurred in Well Ceramics & Glass, 878 F2d 659. For further discussion, see
text at note 74.
" In Lever Brothers, 877 F2d 101, the domestic trademark holder sued to enjoin the
third-party importation of goods produced by Lever UK, a British subsidiary that produced
soaps and detergents under the same trademark as Lever USA but with substantial differ-
ences to account for the different tastes between consumers in the two markets.
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other than the corporation or its subsidiary fall into this third cat-
egory of gray market goods.-Under the current Customs Regula-
tions, the Tariff Act does not bar importation of these goods.5 7
B. The Most Recent Supreme Court Decision on the Gray Mar-
ket Issue: K Mart Corp. v Cartier, Inc.
After Congress passed the Tariff Act in 1922, subsequent gray
market cases should have been fairly easy to decide. The Tariff Act
prohibits importing
into the United States any merchandise of foreign manufac-
ture if such merchandise, or the label, sign, print, package,
wrapper, or receptacle, bears a trademark owned by a citizen
of, or by a corporation or association created or organized
within, the United States, and registered in the Patent and
Trademark Office by a person domiciled in the United States
• ..unless written consent of the owner of such trademark is
produced at the time of making entry.58
The statute seemed to prohibit entirely the import of "merchan-
dise of foreign manufacture" bearing a trademark owned by a
United States corporation. However, a complete ban on gray mar-
ket imports did not materialize. Because of the haste with which
Congress debated and adopted the Tariff Act, ambiguities sur-
rounded it.59 Although those supporting the Act stated that its
purpose was "to prevent fraud,"60 Congress did not discuss this di-
rective at length.
1. The K Mart holding and the Tariff Act.
In K Mart Corp. v Cartier, Inc., the Supreme Court settled
some of the questions surrounding the gray market e.6 The respon-
dents in K Mart were two members of COPIAT62 and the associa-
tion itself, that challenged the Customs regulations relevant to the
-7 19 CFR § 133.21(f)(2) (1991).
', 19 USC § 1526(a).
'9 The amendment to the Tariff Act left many important questions about its applica-
tion unanswered before and after its adoption. Senate Debate on Amendment to 19 USC §
1526, 67th Cong, 2d Sess, in 62 Cong Rec 11605 (Aug 19, 1922).
" Id at 11603.
61 486 US 281 (1988).
"2 In 1984, 40 manufacturers and distributors of trademarked goods formed a trade
association, the Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT) to
formally express their opposition to the gray market. There are now over 60 members.
Dwyer and Dunkin, Bus Week at 30 (cited in note 1).
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Tariff Act. Those regulations exempted two types of gray market
goods from the Tariff Act's ban on importation. First, the Act did
not deny entry to gray market goods produced under common
ownership or control, meaning either a parent-subsidiary relation-
ship or common individual or aggregate ownership of more than
fifty percent."' Second, goods produced abroad that are authorized
to use the domestic trademark through licensing agreement or sim-
ilar arrangement were also exempted from the Tariff Act's restric-
tions."4 Respondents asserted that these regulations were inconsis-
tent with the Tariff Act.65 Petitioners, K Mart and 47th Street
Photo, intervened as defendants.6 6 The district court upheld the
Customs regulations,67 but the D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that
the Customs regulations were an unreasonable interpretation of
the Tariff Act's ban. 8
Motivated by free-riding and equity concerns, all members of
the K Mart Court agreed that the Tariff Act banned gray market
goods imported by a third party after a domestic company had
purchased rights to use the trademark from a foreign firm. 9 Be-
cause the domestic company has invested in a trademark to profit
from its reputation, it would be unfair to force the trademark
holder to engage in "sharp intrabrand competition" from import-
ers of the same product who have not incurred the requisite invest-
ment expenses. However, the Court stated that imports should not
be banned under § 1526 of the Tariff Act when a foreign corpora-
tion establishes an American subsidiary which registers the trade-
mark in the United States. 0 In such a case, the subsidiary is really
nothing but a corporate shell for the foreign interest and, there-
fore, deserves no protection from the United States Tariff Act.
Furthermore, the ambiguous nature of § 1526's phrase "merchan-
dise of foreign manufacture" would not cover imported goods when
" 19 CFR § 133.21(c)(1) & (2).
64 Because the K Mart case struck down this second exception, authorized use is no
longer available for gray market importation without consent from the domestic trademark
holder. See K Mart, 486 US at 294-95 (holding that 19 CFR § 133.21(c)(2) was in conflict
with the plain language of 19 USC § 1526).
486 US at 290.
06 K Mart and 47th Street Photo are frequent purchasers of gray market goods. See
Robert J. Staaf, The International Gray Market: The Nexus of Vertical Restraints, Price
Discrimination and Foreign Law, 19 U Miami Int-Am L Rev 37, 70 (1987).
"' Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks ("COPIAT") v United
States, 598 F Supp 844, 853 (D DC 1984).
8 COPIAT, 790 F2d at 918.
69 K Mart, 486 US at 292.
70 Id.
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both the foreign and domestic trademarks are owned by the same
business entity or by different business entities subject to common
control.71 Thus, goods produced by the same corporation or by a
corporate affiliate under common control would be admitted to the
United States even without the written consent of the United
States trademark holder. However, gray market goods produced
under licensing agreements with foreign manufacturers would be
denied entry by Customs.
Under K Mart, the common-control exception still enables
gray marketeers to avoid the Tariff Act's ban on their imports.
Consequently, some degree of conflict persists as to the appropri-
ate range of trademark legislation and the role it should play in
protecting trademark holders. Despite K Mart's holding, this as-
pect of the gray market problem remains to be solved. This third
scenario and its resolution under the Lanham Act are the focus of
this Comment.
2. K Mart and the Lanham Act.
Some commentators believe that gray market trademark
claims "suffered a set back in the COPIAT [K Mart] opinions. '72
However, K Mart only ruled on the propriety of Customs regula-
tions issued pursuant to the Tariff Act. The K Mart Court did not
consider the applicability of the Lanham Act.
Justice Scalia noted in his dissent that the first subsection of
the Customs Regulations at issue in K Mart was not relevant to
the Tariff Act. In this discussion, he mentioned that § 42 of the
Lanham Act applies to copies or simulated trademarks; therefore
§ 42 may be unavailable for domestic trademark holders against
gray marketeers. Nevertheless, the fact that § 42 of the Lanham
Act may not protect genuine trademarked goods whose trademarks
are identical to United States trademarks does not preclude trade-
mark holders' claims under § 43. Section 43 is particularly applica-
ble because it explicitly prohibits trademarks that are confusing to
consumers regarding the origin, sponsorship, or approval of goods
marked with such trademarks-regardless of the "genuineness" of
the trademark. 3
" These are the goods exempted under the first two sections of the Customs Regula-
tions, 19 CFR § 133.21(c)(1) and (2).
72 Jamie S. Gorelick and Julia E. Guttman, Parallel Importation After K Mart v.
Cartier ("COPIAT"), 70 J Patent and Trademark Office Society 696, 700 (1988).
11 See text accompanying notes 30-34.
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The K Mart Court permitted the importation of goods pro-
duced by a foreign manufacturer that registers the trademark
through a United States subsidiary. Although some argue this
point is an indication that the Court did not recognize the territo-
riality doctrine, 4 it is more likely that the Court permitted this
exception only because foreign companies should not be able to
protect themselves under United States tariff law. This construc-
tion, based on deference to the agency's interpretation of who
"owns" the trademark, 5 is reasonable in the tariff context, but is
inapplicable to the trademark context.
The major consequence of K Mart is that a domestic trade-
mark holder is faced with extreme difficulty in trying to prevent
gray market importation when the gray market goods are manufac-
tured abroad by a foreign manufacturer, subsidiary, or an unincor-
porated division. Because the Court upheld the Customs Regula-
tions permitting the entry of goods that fall within the common-
control exception, domestic trademark holders are left without ad-
equate tariff protection against the purveyors of gray market
goods. The Lanham Act provides one possible avenue of protection
against this infringement. However, as the next Section illustrates,
the circuit courts are split on the propriety of using the Lanham
Act as a sword against gray marketeers. 7
III. THE LANHAM ACT AND THE GRAY MARKET: DISSENSION
AMONG THE COURTS
Since the decision in K Mart, courts -have re-addressed the
possible protections available to trademark holders against gray
market importers. K Maft clearly upheld the validity of the Cus-
toms regulation's common-control exception, and struck down the
exception for authorized use. Therefore, trademark holders can
seek protection under the Tariff Act if the goods imported were
=4 Gorelick and Guttman, 70 J Patent and Trademark Office Society at 701-02 (cited in
note 72).
" K Mart, 486 US at 292.
" See Weil Ceramics & Glass, 878 F2d at 671-72, where the court found that trade-
mark law would be inappropriate to protect the United States subsidiary from gray market
imports. Weil Ceramics & Glass may be restricted to a situation in which a foreign manu-
facturer establishes a United States subsidiary, since those goods could be imported under
the Tariff Act, but not to the other scenarios in which there is common control (i.e., when
the United States manufacturer establishes a foreign subsidiary or unincorporated manufac-
turing division). This was suggested in Lever Brothers, 877 F2d at 111 (discussing the appli-
cability of the Lanham Act as a means of protecting domestic trademark holders against
gray market goods and deciding that such a claim would be proper, pending rebriefing of the
issue).
[59:13631376
Gray Marketeers
manufactured under a licensing agreement. The gray market prob-
lem that remains involves the common-control exception.1 Domes-
tic trademark holders' efforts to protect their trademarks from
gray market goods through the Lanham Act have met with limited
success. The courts disagree over the applicability of the Lanham
Act to the gray market context.
Some courts believe that since gray market products are genu-
ine, they cannot cause confusion, and therefore cannot be chal-
lenged under § 43 of the Lanham Act. 8 Others have held that lack
of quality control or the physical differences between domestic
products and gray market goods bearing the same trademark may
cause confusion.1 ' Still other courts have restricted gray market
products in order to protect domestic trademark holders from loss
of their goodwill or from free-riding.8 ° No clear standard has yet
emerged for evaluating trademark claims against gray market
importers.
A. Consumer Confusion in the Gray Market Context
The clearest example of genuine goods that can confuse con-
sumers arises when there are physical differences between the two
products. In Lever Brothers Co. v United States, the D.C. Circuit
adopted a provisional reading, pending rebriefing, of § 42 of the
Lanham Act that would bar "foreign goods bearing a trademark
identical to a valid U.S. trademark but physically different, regard-
less of the trademarks' genuine character abroad or affiliation be-
tween the producing firms."81 In Lever Brothers the versions of
Sunlight dishwashing liquid and Shield soap produced in the
United Kingdom were significantly different from those versions
7 Legislation clarifying the Tariff Act and redefining the appropriate role of the Cus-
toms regulations would be the simplest solution. Many have commented on the lack of con-
gressional and judicial finality in deciding the fate of gray market goods. See Miller, 76
Trademark Rptr at 363 (cited in note 4); Seth E. Lipner, Gray Market Goulash: The Prob-
lem of At-the-Border Restrictions on Importation of Genuine Trademarked Goods, 77
Trademark Rptr 77, 91 n 93 (1987).
" Olympus Corp., 792 F2d at 321; Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc. v Daewoo International
(America) Corp., 707 F2d 1054, 1058 (9th Cir 1983); H.L. Hayden Co. of N.Y., Inc. v Sie-
mens Medical Systems, Inc., 879 F2d 1005, 1023 (2d Cir 1989).
79 El Greco Leather Products Co., Inc. v Shoe World, Inc., 806 F2d 392. 395-96 (2d Cir
1986); Ferrero U.S.A., Inc. v Ozak Trading, Inc., 753 F Supp 1240, 1247 (D NJ 1991); Origi-
nal Appalachian Artworks, 816 F2d at 73.
60 Original Appalachian Artworks, 816 F2d at 73; Premier Dental Products Co. v
Darby Dental Supply Co., Inc., 794 F2d 850, 859 (3d Cir 1986); Osawa, 589 F Supp at 1168-
74.
8, 877 F2d at 111. No final decision on the outcome of the rebriefing has been
published.
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produced in the United States. The versions differed because of
"differing consumer preferences, climatic conditions and regulatory
standards.""2 Lever Brothers sued under § 42 to force the Customs
Service to seize the British versions of the products.
In Ferrero U.S.A., Inc. v Ozak Trading, Inc., the court consid-
ered a domestic trademark holder's § 32(1) and § 43(a) challenges
to the gray market importation of Tic Tac breath mints produced
in the United Kingdom. 83 Like the court in Lever Brothers, the
court also paid careful attention to the fact that the goods were
physically different. The Ferrero court distinguished Lever Broth-
ers'from Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v Dash84 on the basis that no
physical differences in products were apparent in the latter case.8 5
In Ferrero, the United States version of the breath mint differed
from the United Kingdom product in size, calorie content, and
chemical composition.8 6 The Ferrero court commented that the
reasoning and analysis used in the § 42 context of Lever and Weil
was equally applicable to the § 43 question.17 The material differ-
ences in the domestic products and the gray market goods were
found to be confusing enough that the court ordered a permanent
injunction against the importation and distribution of United
Kingdom Tic Tac products in the United States."'
The Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Original
Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v Granada Electronics, Inc.." There
the gray market goods, Cabbage Patch Kids manufactured in
Spain, were found to be substantially different from the authorized
distributor's and licensee's Cabbage Patch Kids because most of
the dolls' "adoption papers" and "birth certificates" were in Span-
ish, not English. Furthermore, the United States fulfillment houses
were not able or willing to process the adoption certificates or mail
the birthday cards to the dolls' purchasers, as the authorized licen-
see did.90 The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order of
injunctive relief based on § 32 of the Lanham Act.
82 877 F2d at 103.
11 753 F Supp 1240, aff'd, 935 F2d 1281 (3d Cir 1991).
84 878 F2d 659 (3d Cir 1989).
11 Ferrero, 753 F Supp at 1246. For further discussion see Yamaha Corp. of America v
United States, 745 F Supp 730, 732 (D DC 1990).
88 753 F Supp at 1244.
87 Id at 1246 n 10 ("The analysis employed in assessing the impact of such action is no
less valid and illuminating, merely because a differing statutory provision is in question.").
88 Id at 1247.
88 816 F2d 68 (2d Cir 1987).
8o Id at 73.
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The cases discussed above indicate the courts' willingness to
find consumer confusion when there are substantial differences be-
tween the domestic trademark holder's products and the gray mar-
ket goods. Some domestic mark holders have also been successful
in their claims against gray marketeers even when the challenged
goods are genuine and lack any observable differences from the do-
mestic goods.9 1 Although the opinions in the cases do not elaborate
at great length, it is clear that the decisive factor in each decision
was the gray market importer's failure to obtain the trademark
holder's consent to the importation.2 The courts viewed the lack
of sponsorship or consent as tantamount to the sale of non-genuine
goods: products cannot be genuine unless the trademark holder ap-
proves them for sale. These cases are, however, the exception.
Most courts faced with trademark holders seeking protection
under the Lanham Act from gray market imports have decided
that genuine gray market goods cannot be confusing. The Second
Circuit in Olympus Corp. v United States93 stated this position
succinctly: "The plain language of [the Lanham Act] does not bar
importation if the goods are genuine, only if they 'copy or simulate'
a trademark."94 Olympus Corporation, the exclusive distributor,
trademark holder and wholly owned subsidiary of a Japanese cam-
era manufacturer, challenged the Customs regulations that permit-
ted the gray market imports produced by a foreign parent com-
pany. Forty-Seventh Street Photo and K Mart sold this camera
equipment at discount prices. Olympus tried to halt the importa-
tion of gray market goods, but the Second Circuit upheld the Cus-
toms regulation and denied relief under § 42 of the Lanham Act.
The court indicated that it would apply the Lanham Act only
when counterfeit or spurious trademarks are involved.
91 Premier Dental, 794 F2d at 858; El Greco Leather, 806 F2d at 395.
11 See Premier Dental, 794 F2d at 857 ("[T]he legislative history amply demonstrates
Congress's intent to bar imports even of 'genuine' goods, where the importation is not au-
thorized by the domestic trademark holder."); El Greco, 806 F2d at 396 (defendant found
liable for trademark infringement when it did not "at the minimum seek [] instructions
from the [trademark holder] on how to dispose of [the goods]"),
93 792 F2d 315 (2d Cir 1986). Olympus sought declaratory and injunctive relief declar-
ing the Customs Regulations concerning the Tariff Act invalid, or in the alternative, injunc-
tive relief barring the importation of gray market goods under § 42 of the Lanham Act. The
court denied relief on both grounds.
" Id at 321.
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B. Damages" Asserted Under the Lanham Act: Loss of Goodwill,
Lack of Quality Control, and Free-Riding
Recovery under § 43 of the Lanham Act requires a showing of
damages. 95 Domestic trademark holders can be damaged by gray
market imports in three ways. First, a domestic trademark holder
may assert that gray market goods confuse consumers about spon-
sorship of the goods and may result in a loss of goodwill. Ordina-
rily, under the doctrine of exhaustion, once the trademarked goods
are released into the stream of commerce, the trademark owner no
longer controls them.9 6 However, some courts have held that ex-
haustion does not apply where the United States trademark holder
has developed a separate and independent goodwill.
For example, in Original Appalachian Artworks, the court
noted the loss of goodwill from confusion over the source of the
Cabbage Patch Kids with foreign-language birth certificates, even
though the dolls imported by gray marketeers were produced
under a legitimate licensing agreement.9 7 Similarly, in Premier
Dental Products Co. v Darby Dental Supply Co., Inc.,9" the court
noted the loss of goodwill from confusion over the source of the
dental products, even though genuine products were imported by
the gray market importer.
Second, and a related point, domestic trademark holders may
claim that they lack the ability to control the quality of the gray
market goods. If the gray market goods are inferior in quality or
have some characteristic that distinguishes them from the domesti-
cally manufactured products as a result of this lack of quality con-
trol, the domestic trademark holder may suffer a loss of goodwill.
In El Greco Leather Products, Co., Inc. v Shoe World Inc.,99 the
Second Circuit suggested that the loss of goodwill due to lack of
quality control was adequate grounds for an injunction against fur-
ther importation and a source of damages under the Lanham Act.
Even though the shoes at issue were manufactured pursuant to the
domestic trademark holder's instructions, the court found a proper
cause of action because the shoes lacked certificates of inspection.
The court held that the "guarantee function" of trademarks-the
ability of the producer to convey information to consumers con-
9' 15 USC § 1125 (1988).
Original Appalachian Artworks, 816 F2d at 73.
9 Id.
98 794 F2d at 859. The court affirmed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunc-
tion under the Tariff Act, 19 USC § 1526.
99 806 F2d 392 (2d Cir 1986).
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cerning the quality of a product through its trade-
mark' 0°-warranted the protection of the Lanham Act. Specifi-
cally, the court found that "[t]he mere act of ordering a product to
be labeled with a trademark does not deprive its holder of the
right to control the product and the trademark."' 01
In contrast, other courts have not accepted the loss of the do-
mestic manufacturer's goodwill as a basis for recovery under
§ 43(a). 02 Some courts have dismissed the lack of quality control
as an unnecessary inquiry when the goods are genuine, whether or
not the companies are under common control. 03
The third way in which gray market goods may damage trade-
mark holders is through free-riding. Free-riding occurs when a do-
mestic trademark holder, usually the authorized distributor in the
gray market context, invests money, time, and effort in developing
its trademark." 4 When third parties import goods manufactured
abroad bearing the same trademark as products of a United States
trademark owner, they can take advantage of the money the do-
mestic trademark holder has spent on advertising and promotion.
They get a "free-ride" because consumers are not aware of the dif-
ferent sources of the product; the consumers only know that they
recently saw the trademark advertised on television or through
some other media.
However, some courts have been reluctant to recognize injuries
from free-riding as redressable in trademark law, at least as against
distributors. 05 For example, in Weil Ceramics & Glass, the court
acknowledged that the domestic trademark holder suffered a "not
100 Original Appalachian Artworks, 816 F2d at 75, citing R. Callmann, 3A Unfair Com-
petition, Trademarks and Monopolies § 12.17 at 75 (L. Altman, 4th ed 1983).
101 El Greco, 806 F2d at 395-96.
102 NEC Electronics v CAL Circuit Abco, 810 F2d 1506 (9th Cir 1987); Weil Ceramics
& Glass, 878 F2d at 672; Sasson Jeans, Inc. v Sasson Jeans, L.A., Inc., 632 F Supp 1525,
1528-29 (S D NY 1986).
103 H.L. Hayden, 879 F2d at 1023. In Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc. v Daewoo International,
the court stated that "absence of Monte Carlo's authorization... to sell does not alter [the
genuine nature of the shirts]." 707 F2d 1054, 1058 (9th Cir 1983). The lack of quality control
was not an adequate ground for protection for an unregistered trademark. The court also
doubted the trademark holder's claim that he could not inspect the shirts for quality. The
court interpreted the evidence as demonstrating adequate opportunity to inspect and de-
nied relief to the trademark holder. The court believed that an injunction barring the im-
portation of the genuine goods was not warranted since there was no actionable common-
law trademark infringement. Id at 1057-58.
"' Miller, 76 Trademark Rptr at 373-74 (cited in note 4). The Senate report listed the
concern with free riding in its description of the evils that the Lanham Act was designed to
combat. S Rep No 1333, in 1946 USCCAN at 1274 (cited in note 18).
100 See Weil Ceramics & Glass, 878 F2d-at 672 n 18.
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inconsequential or insignificant" injury from the gray market im-
porter's free-riding on Weil's advertising and promotion costs,108
but refused to use trademark law to provide a remedy. To justify
its decision, the court offered only the fact that the domestic trade-
mark holder was not entirely uncompensated because of its parent
corporation's profits from the sale abroad to the third party.1 0
7
However, several courts have acknowledged the unfair results
that occur when free-riding is allowed. The court in Osawa & Co. v
B&H Photo described in great detail the plaintiff's advertising ex-
penditures and public relations efforts, noting that they were in-
curred "largely for the benefit of its competitors, the grey market
sellers, who free ride on plaintiff's publicity."'1 8 Accordingly, the
court granted the plaintiff a preliminary injunction on trademark
claims brought under Sections 32, 42, and 43 of the Lanham Act
and under the Tariff Act. 09 Similarly, the court in Original Appa-
lachian Artworks'" pointed out that the domestic licensee of the
trademark invested millions of dollars to advertise the Cabbage
Patch Kids. The gray market importer had unfairly capitalized on
the popularity obtained through the licensee's advertising
campaign.
In summary, the courts have expressed divergent opinions
over whether gray market goods can cause- consumer confusion and
whether domestic trademark holders are damaged by the sale of
such goods. This lack of uniformity evidenced by these divergent
opinions demonstrates the need for a clear delineation of the ap-
propriate application of the Lanham Act in the gray market con-
text. The next Section explains how the Lanham Act may be used
against gray marketeers.
106 Id at 672.
"o Id. Because Weil was the wholly owned subsidiary of the Spanish porcelain manu-
facturer, Lladro, its parent company profited from the sale of its products abroad. Even
though a portion of these sales were to gray market importers whose imports competed with
Weil's sales, the Third Circuit believed that Weil profited indirectly from this sale of Lladro
products abroad. Since the trademark holder was a wholly owned subsidiary of the foreign
manufacturer, the corporate entity "has an obvious self-help mechanism: it can cease the
sale to [importer] and thereby eliminate effectively its United States competition .... " Id
at 668.
... 589 F Supp at 1168.
109 Id at 1179.
11 816 F2d at 71.
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IV. THE LANHAM ACT: PROTECTION FOR DOMESTIC TRADEMARK
HOLDERS FROM GRAY MARKET GOODS
The legislative history of the Lanham Act demonstrates that
Congress intended to protect the trademark investments of domes-
tic trademark holders from gray market importers. The Lanham
Act was designed to shield consumers from confusion and to safe-
guard the goodwill created by the domestic trademark holder. The
Supreme Court did not decide this issue in K Mart, which involved
the Tariff Act, not the Lanham Act. This Section argues that
courts should recognize trademark claims asserted against gray
marketeers by domestic trademark holders under the Lanham Act.
A. The Purposes of the Lanham Act
While some commentators have encouraged United States
trademark owners to pursue claims against gray marketeers under
the Lanham Act to protect their trademark interests from infringe-
ment,1"' the courts are divided on the same question. The provi-
sions of the Lanham Act appear helpful to domestic trademark
holders. The plain language of § 43 addresses:
any false designation of origin, false or misleading description
of fact ... which-(1) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection or asso-
ciation ... or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his
or her goods .... 112
Because the language is rather broad, the Lanham Act's legislative
history is helpful in discerning the Act's proper role in gray market
cases.
Congress clearly intended the Lanham Act to be used "to pre-
vent diversion of trade through misrepresentation .... ."1"" This is
what I refer to below as protection of the domestic trademark
holder's investment. 1 4 The Senate committee that reported on the
bill which was to become the Lanham Act also stated that for "the
protection of the public against deception, a sound public policy
requires that trade-marks should receive nationally the greatest
"' See, for example, Siegrun D. Kane, The Gray Market and Trademark Infringe-
ment: Are Genuine Goods Created Equal?, 70 J Patent and Trademark Office Society 677
(1988); William H. Allen, The Supreme Court's Gray Market Decision, 70 J Patent and
Trademark Office Society 688, 693 (1988).
12 15 USC § 1125(a).
1S Rep No 1333, in 1946 USCCAN at 1277 (cited in note 18).
11 See Section IV.A.2.
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protection that can be given them." '115 In support of this proposi-
tion, the Senate committee cited Justice Holmes's opinion in Kat-
zel, the first major gray market case.11
1. 'Protection against confusion.
The trademark protects the public by allowing purchasers to
distinguish among competing goods and choose the product they
desire."1  As illustrated by the cases in which the domestic trade-
mark holder's products are physically different from the gray mar-
ket products bearing the same trademark, gray market goods frus-
trate this purpose. This was best demonstrated in Lever Brothers
and Ferrero.118 In both of these cases there were significant and
confusing physical differences between the domestically-trade-
marked good and the good branded abroad with the same
trademark.
There is often the possibility that goods imported by those
other than the authorized dealer are inferior to those carried by
the authorized distributor. For example, the goods may have been
damaged during the trip overseas." 9 Additionally, goods with a
limited shelf life may experience a reduction in quality because of
the time that it takes to import them to the United States. 2 '
Consumers are often completely unaware of the possible
problems with gray market goods. The purchaser may not realize
that the product does not comply with government standards,' 2 ' or
that the imported goods are different from those produced domes-
tically. 22 In such cases, the trademark loses its utility because it no
"' S Rep No 1333, in 1946 USCCAN 1277 (cited in note 18).
11 Justice Holmes briefly described a trademark as "stak[ing] the reputation of the
plaintiff upon the character of the goods." Bourjois, 260 US at 692.
11 S Rep No 1333, in 1946 USCCAN at 1275.
118 See text at notes 81-88.
119 See Adolph Coors Co. v A. Genderson & Sons, Inc., 486 F Supp 131 (D Colo 1980)
(quality of beer rendered inferior due to non-refrigerated storage); Comment, Applying Gre-
cian Formula to International Trade: K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. and the Legality of
Gray Market Imports, 75 Va L Rev 1397, 1416 (1989).
.20 In the Matter of Certain Alkaline Batteries, 225 USPQ (BNA) 823 (USITC 1984),
nonacq 225 USPQ (BNA) 862, appeal dismissed sub nom Duracell, Inc. v United States
International Trade Commission, 778 F2d 1578 (Fed Cir 1985).
" See Scott D. Gilbert, Eugene A. Ludwig, and Carol A. Fortune, Federal Trademark
Law and the Gray Market: The Need for a Cohesive Policy, 18 L & Policy in Intl Bus 103,
110-11 (1986) ("Many [gray market] products do not comply with U.S. ingredient labelling
requirements. Others may contain ingredients prohibited by federal law because they may
cause severe allergic reactions or may be carcinogenic.") (footnotes omitted).
122 Several states, including New York, California, and Connecticut have passed laws to
combat this specific problem. The legislation requires labeling on gray market goods to
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longer indicates a level of quality or some other recognizable
characteristic.
Courts have sometimes recognized the problem of consumer
confusion that can result from gray market products, particularly
when the domestically-produced goods are physically different
from their gray market counterparts. 23 This reading is the most
faithful to the purposes of the Lanham Act. Indeed, § 43 of the
Lanham Act is designed to protect consumers from "any goods"
that are "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such per-
son with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or ap-
proval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities
... "124 This Comment argues that § 43 can and should be used
to combat the confusion engendered by gray market goods that
possess different characteristics from domestic goods branded with
the same trademark.
Unfortunately, courts that have found that genuine goods do
not confuse consumers cannot account for consumers' inability to
determine whether differences exist between the domestic product
and those imported on the gray market. 25 Regardless of whether
the trademark was legally placed on the package, the courts have
overlooked the possibility that identical trademarks might re-
present different information for different geographical areas. 26
heighten consumer awareness of the possibility that the products they are purchasing may
differ in some respects from the domestic counterparts with which they are familiar. NY
Gen Bus Law § 218-00(3) (McKinney 1988); Cal Civ Code § 1797.81 (West 1988); Conn Gen
Stat § 42-210 (West 1986).
123 See Section III.A.
124 15 USC § 1125(a).
126 Yamaha Corporation of America v United States, 703 F Supp 1398, 1401-02 (C D
Cal 1988) (electronic equipment manufactured by trademark owners' foreign parent is genu-
ine and cannot cause confusion); Diamond Supply Company v Prudential Paper Products
Co., Inc., 589 F Supp 470, 475-76 (S D NY 1984) ("identical or qualitatively equivalent"
stationary cannot cause public confusion); Monte Carlo Shirt, 707 F2d at 1058 (genuine
shirts, manufactured for trademark holder under contract, cannot cause confusion);
Parfums Stern, Inc. v United States Customs Service, 575 F Supp 416, 417 (S D Fla 1983)
(sale on gray market of uncontroverted, equally good, legitimate fragrance products does not
harm public); American Honda Motor Co., Inc. v Carolina Autosports Leasing and Sales,
Inc., 645 F Supp 863, 867 (W D NC 1986) (genuine automobiles will not cause confusion);
Sasson Jeans, 632 F Supp at 1528-29 (genuine jeans, whose manufacture and trademark
affi.ation was authorized by trademark holders, cannot cause consumer confusion).
2I See the discussion of the territorial nature of trademarks in Section IV.B.
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2. Protection of investment by domestic trademark holder.
Gray market imports also undermine the second purpose of
the Lanham Act, the protection from "misappropriation by pirates
and cheats."'127 Such misappropriation ordinarily appears as loss of
goodwill or free-riding.
a) Loss of goodwill. Courts that have recognized damages
under the Lanham Act stemming from lost goodwill can trace
redressability of lost goodwill to the Senate report on the Lanham
Act.12 The Senate report specifically states that one of the goals of
the Lanham Act was to "secure trade-mark owners in the goodwill
which they have built up .... "I2 Some courts have seized upon
the Senate's clear interest in protecting goodwill and recognized
claims for lost goodwill. 3 ' As in Lever Brothers,13' domestically-
produced goods may be physically different from those manufac-
tured abroad. Once the purchaser discovers these discrepancies,
she may be disappointed or confused. For example, in the hypo-
thetical which introduced this Comment, Frieda may be disap-
pointed by the unreliability of the gray market Nikon camera she
purchased. The authorized distributor, who is readily identified
with the product through marketing efforts, suffers a loss of good-
will that may translate into decreased sales.
Loss of goodwill is also a concern with consumers who are una-
ware of the origin of the goods and may mistakenly expect war-
ranty and repair services from the authorized distributor of the
product. 32 Recall that Frieda took her camera back to the author-
ized dealer for servicing. If the authorized distributor honors the
gray market consumer's request for service, it loses money because
the dealer has not profited from the sale of the good but incurs the
expense of servicing the product under the customary warranty
provisions. On the other hand, if the domestic trademark holder
refuses to provide these services, he may lose the consumer's brand
loyalty and forfeit possible future sales. 3 3 Either way, the domestic
trademark holder's bottom line profitability is impaired.
27 S Rep No 1333, in 1946 USCCAN at 1274 (cited in note 18).
128 Id at 1276.
129 Id.
122 See text accompanying notes 95-100.
877 F2d 101 (DC Cir 1989). See also Ferrero, 753 F Supp 1240.
132 See, for example, Rich Warren, Walkman and friends: A Guide to Pocket Stereo,
Chi Trib, Du Page Sports Final Edition 67 (Nov 17, 1989).
"I This predicament arose in NEC Electronics, 810 F2d at 1508 (some purchasers
thought their goods were covered by trademark holder's servicing and warranties), and
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b) Losses from free-riding. The Lanham Act is a proper
means of combatting free-riding by gray marketeers. One of the
purposes of the Lanham Act is to protect the investments of do-
mestic companies in trademark development and maintenance.3 4
"[F]ree-riding is more likely where domestic marketing costs are a
larger share of the total costs of producing and marketing a prod-
uct, and where shipping costs are a smaller share."' 35 Thus, free-
riding is more problematic with goods that can be easily shipped,
but are relatively expensive for the authorized distributor to adver-
tise.136 Gray market goods are very often small products like per-
fume, watches, cameras, batteries and cosmetics. 3 ' Shipping these
products is fairly easy because of their size, yet advertising costs
for these goods are fairly high.138
Part of the impact of free-riding is that trademark owners lose
potential sales to gray marketeers. This stems from a perhaps mis-
taken consumer perception that they can purchase the same prod-
ucts at a lower cost. 39 Because the quality difference in these
products is often undetectable at the time of the sale, consumers
will purchase the less expensive good, unaware of its potential
flaws. Because of this free-riding, many major gray market import-
ers can offer gray market products at a lower cost; they need only
incur the relatively small costs of transportation, while the author-
ized distributor bears the much more substantial costs of advertis-
ing and promotions. 14 0
Gray market importers do not only free-ride on the domestic
trademark holder's advertising expenditures. They also free-ride
on personnel employed by the authorized dealer. Distributors often
train retailers and may even provide them with free customer sam-
ples.' As a result, the trained retailers can provide consumers
with more guidance in choosing between goods. Recall that Frieda
spent an hour with the Nikons, Etc. salesperson. She learned
enough through his demonstrations of different equipment to con-
Osawa, 589 F Supp at 1168 (trademark holder must provide free servicing or suffer damage
to his mark).
134 See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 US 189, 198 (1985).
135 Lexecon, The Economics of Gray-Market Imports at 34 (cited in note 4).
136 Id at 7, 35.
,37 See text accompanying note 2.
Lexecon, The Economics of Gray-Market Imports at 35.
,' William H. Allen, Some Revisions of Gray Market Decalogue: A Response to
Messrs. Lewin and Steele, 10 Hastings Comm/Ent L J 1075, 1079 (1988).
o Lexecon, The Economics of Gray-Market Imports at 7, 35.
For an example of a distributor who invested resources in training retailers, see
Osawa, 589 F Supp at 1166.
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fidently make a purchasing decision. If customers know that they
can get detailed, time-consuming, and helpful demonstrations from
authorized retailers, and then purchase similar products from gray
market importers, free-riding will erode distributors' willingness to
train personnel.142
Sometimes, however, gray market importers or the stores
which purchase from them offer their own refunds, return policies,
or warranties independent of the authorized distributor.143 Retail
stores like Montgomery Ward and K Mart switched to gray market
importers for some items because of those importers' better service
and value.14 These department stores are unlikely to be deceptive
in selling defective goods because they depend on repeat sales as
much as an authorized distributor. 4" However, these stores are
distinguishable from smaller gray market importers who can afford
to be deceptive because they can easily get in and out of the mar-
ket. 41 Opponents of the gray market are primarily concerned with
these small importers.
The COPIAT organization opposes gray market imports for
the additional reason that the continued influx of such products
may eventually lead to domestic unemployment. Free-riding may
cripple American authorized distributors, affecting production of
the domestic manufacturer. 47 Organized labor also has strong con-
cerns about the "erosion of the branded products produced by
Americans, leaving currently productive workers unemployed.' '1 48
The legislative history of the Lanham Act indicates that pro-
tection of American industry was one of its major objectives: "to
secure to the business community the advantages of reputation
and good will by preventing their diversion from those who have
created them to those who have not.' 149 In summary, the Lanham
Act should be read to protect trademark owners from the harmful
effects of free-riding on the goodwill that they have created.
,42 Lexecon, The Economics of Gray-Market Imports at 42 (cited in note 4).
"I' Staaf, 19 U Miami Int-Am L Rev at 69 (cited in note 66).
.. Id at 70.
145 Id.
246 Id.
'47 Note, The Gray Market and the Customs Regulation-Is the Controversy Really
Over After K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.?, 65 Chi Kent L Rev 221, 227-28 (1989).
148 Bureau of National Affairs, Bill To Curb Gray Market Imports Debated at Hearing
by Senate Judiciary Committee, 7 Intl Trade Rptr 551 (Apr 18, 1990).
... S Rep No 1333, in 1946 USCCAN at 1275 (cited in note 18).
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B. The Territoriality Doctrine in the Gray Market Context
The ability of a trademark to serve a territorial function is
acknowledged as the dominant theory of trademark law today.150
The adoption of the territorial approach is significant. Under the
territoriality view, any trademark that is not that of the trademark
holder for the territory in which the product is sold will confuse
consumers. This is true no matter how genuine that trademark is
for another territory.
The courts that recognize the possibility of consumer confu-
sion with gray market goods that are "genuine" also recognize that
trademarks serve a territorial function. Territoriality recognizes
that a trademark has "a separate legal existence in each nation". 51
that can be assigned according to the dictates of the Paris Conven-
tion.'5 2 Courts that believe that trademarks serve only to indicate
the source of manufacture ignore the potential confusion that can
occur even if the trademark was affixed legally in one territory.
These courts overlook the fact that one trademark can be used in
different territories by different distributors, and consequently can
represent different qualities for consumers from different areas.
The trademark rights held by an owner in one country are dis-
tinct from the rights of an identical trademark owned in another
country under international law.'53 Domestic trademark holders
should be able to protect themselves from free-riding and loss of
goodwill, even if the gray market goods are produced by a foreign
manufacturing subsidiary or division subject to the same control as
the domestic trademark holder. The cases illustrate the possibility
that even those products manufactured by companies under "com-
mon control" may be different enough to cause substantial confu-
sion among consumers. This confusion should be recognized by
courts as an injury redressable under the Lanham Act since it is
confusing as to "the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her
goods, services, or commercial activities by another person.' 54
CONCLUSION
Injunctions against the importation of gray market goods
should be available to domestic trademark holders. The need for
... See text at notes 41-48.
"' David Bender and Daniel Gogek, Gray Market Goods: Substantive Law, The Law of
Gray and Counterfeit Goods 67 (Practicing Law Institute 1987).
12 McCarthy, 2 Trademarks and Unfair Competition at 536 (cited in note 19).
153 Id.
"' 15 USC § 1125(a).
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such protection is best illustrated in cases where the gray market
goods have substantially different characteristics from products
manufactured domestically carrying the same trademarks. Some
gray market products do not conform to government standards.
Others do not come with the warranties or services offered by the
authorized distributor. Still others may be inferior in quality.
These discrepancies indicate that gray market goods can po-
tentially harm a trademark owner's reputation if such goods are
associated with his or her products. Therefore, domestic trademark
holders should be allowed to bring suits against importers of gray
market products to protect their trademark investments. It is logi-
cal that the statute created specifically for protection against
trademark infringement should protect these trademark owners
from possible infringement of gray market goods.
The language and the history of the Lanham Act support its
applicability to protect domestic trademark holders' rights from vi-
olation by gray market importers. Until federal legislation is
passed to resolve this issue, suits under the Lanham Act will en-
able trademark holders to protect their investments and unassum-
ing consumers from the possible evils of the gray market.
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